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Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with the underwriter’s 
performance based on Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) application of prospect theory to IPO 
underpricing. We assess the plausibility of this measure by studying its power to explain the 
decision-maker’s subsequent choices. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less 
likely to switch underwriters for their first seasoned equity offering when our behavioral measure 
indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter’s performance. Underwriters also appear 
to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract higher fees for subsequent 
transactions involving satisfied decision-makers. Although our tests suggest there is explanatory 
power in the behavioral model, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected 
utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns. 
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The primary equity (or IPO) markets are subject to a variety of well-known idiosyncratic patterns, not 
least the tendency for IPOs to appear underpriced on the first day of trading. The profession has 
invested heavily in explanations for these patterns (see Ritter and Welch (2002) and Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist (2001) for recent reviews). The vast majority of theoretical work in the area builds (at least 
implicitly) on the premise that market participants are rational and maximize expected utility subject 
to the burden of market frictions. Asymmetric information of one sort or another is the friction most 
widely examined and there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that such frictions account for 
at least some of the cross-sectional and time variation in the idiosyncratic patterns. 
And yet the question remains whether we can explain more than a small fraction of variation in the 
data. Recent events related to the ‘dot-com bubble’ of the late 1990s lend weight to this concern and 
lead some researchers to suggest that shifting the focus of the research agenda will lead to more 
progress at the margin. The behavioral perspective represents an alternative to the asymmetric 
information approach but it engenders considerable skepticism among some economists on both 
philosophical and methodological grounds. With regard to the latter, behavioral theories often provide 
sufficient structure for tightly controlled laboratory experiments1 but insufficient structure for simple 
econometric exercises that meaningfully control for the myriad forces at play in financial markets.  
The lone published application of the behavioral paradigm to the IPO market is that of Loughran 
and Ritter (2002). Combining prospect theory with Thaler’s (1980, 1985) notion of mental 
accounting, Loughran and Ritter argue that issuers fail to ‘get upset’ about leaving millions of dollars 
‘on the table’ in the form of large first-day returns because they tend to sum the wealth loss due to 
underpricing with the (often larger) wealth gain on retained shares as prices jump in the after-market. 
Such ‘complacent’ behavior benefits the investment bank if investors engage in rent-seeking to 
increase their chances of being allocated underpriced stock.  
                                                           
1 It is perhaps more accurate to say that the descriptive theory of choice associated most prominently with Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) arose from such tightly controlled experiments. 
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In this paper, we use the structure suggested by Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) behavioral 
perspective to test whether the CEOs of recent IPO firms make subsequent decisions consistent with a 
behavioral measure of their perception of the IPO’s outcome. Specifically, we form two variables 
proxying for whether, and to what degree, the CEO responsible for an IPO was ‘satisfied’ with the 
underwriter’s performance given his wealth loss due to underpricing and his (perceived) wealth gain 
due to the revaluation of his retained shares relative to his anchor value. Loughran and Ritter assume 
the CEO anchors his valuation on the midpoint of the indicative price range filed with the S.E.C. 
We then examine which bank the IPO firm chooses as underwriter for its first seasoned equity 
offering (SEO). Specifically, we test whether the CEO is more likely to retain the IPO underwriter to 
lead-manage the follow-on offer when the behavioral proxies indicate he was satisfied with the IPO 
outcome. From the perspective of expected utility theory, the behavioral proxies should of course 
have no explanatory power. Thus if IPO decision-makers reveal their preferences through their 
subsequent decisions, the plausibility of the underpinnings of Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) behavioral 
story can be examined fairly directly.  
We emphasize that this test can reject only the following joint hypothesis:  
(1) IPO decision-makers anchor on the specific measure of firm value asserted by Loughran 
and Ritter (2002);  
(2) the mapping from an unobserved value function of the form implied by prospect theory to a 
statement of the decision-maker’s satisfaction with the IPO outcome takes the explicit form 
hypothesized by Loughran and Ritter;  
(3) decision-maker satisfaction with the IPO outcome influences the decision whether to 
engage the same bank to underwrite the IPO issuer’s first SEO.2 
The test does not speak directly to whether behavioral deviations from expected utility maximization 
                                                           
2 A strictly rational CEO should view past experience as sunk although perhaps informative of the bank’s ability. 
Assuming the latter is true and given that our proxies for decision-maker satisfaction are derived from public information, 
such signals should be incorporated in the bank’s reputation. Thus our tests control for the reputation of banks within the 
issuer’s subsequent choice set. 
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determine patterns in IPO initial returns but it does shed light on the plausibility of the underlying 
structure necessary for such a linkage to exist. An explicit characterization and test of this linkage 
remains a significant challenge for future research. 
The issuer’s choice of underwriter has recently received considerable scrutiny. Most pertinent to 
our analysis is the work of Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) who claim “there is little evidence 
that firms switch [underwriters] due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the 
IPO”, noting that switchers suffered less IPO underpricing than non-switchers in their sample. Rather, 
they contend that firms ‘graduate’ to more prestigious underwriters whenever possible and 
strategically acquire additional and more influential analyst coverage through their choice of 
underwriters (also see Cliff and Denis (2003) on the latter point).  
In contrast to Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), we find that IPO firms are more likely to 
switch underwriters after the IPO when our behavioral proxies suggest that they were dissatisfied with 
the IPO underwriter’s performance. This difference arises because we measure dissatisfaction along 
the lines of Loughran and Ritter (2002) rather than focusing on underpricing. The finding by Krigman, 
Shaw, and Womack of significantly less underpricing among firms switching underwriters does not 
persist when we include the behavioral proxies for decision-maker satisfaction. 
The behavioral interpretation is more plausible when the issuer’s CEO, with whom the choice of 
underwriter ultimately rests, is the same at both the IPO and the SEO. Consistent with the behavioral 
interpretation, the explanatory power of our proxies is concentrated among firms for which the CEO 
does not change between the two events. Moreover, controlling for CEO background, we find 
evidence suggesting that more experienced and skilled CEOs are less prone to behavioral biases. 
The central result, that satisfaction with the IPO outcome diminishes the probability of switching 
underwriters at the first SEO, also holds when the behavioral proxies for decision-maker satisfaction 
are measured for the group of senior executives collectively. On the other hand, when we focus 
attention on venture-backed firms, we find no evidence that their switching behavior is influenced 
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by behavioral proxies for the venture capitalists’ satisfaction with the IPO outcome. Given their 
regular participation in the IPO process, VCs may be less inclined toward behavioral biases. 
Alternatively, VCs may not be particularly influential in the selection of an underwriter after the IPO. 
These results arise in qualitative choice models that control for a variety of forces previously 
documented in the literature. Specifically, less mature firms are more likely to switch underwriters at 
their first SEO, as are companies that were taken public by less prestigious underwriters, consistent 
with the ‘graduation’ effect. We also find evidence of ‘strategic analyst coverage’ in the sense that 
issuers are more likely to switch when their IPO underwriter did not provide research coverage for the 
issuer’s stock.  
Controlling for these other factors, it is noteworthy that decision-maker satisfaction does not 
reduce the likelihood of switching underwriters among issuers completing their first SEO after the 
bursting of the ‘dot-com bubble’ in the second quarter of 2000. One plausible interpretation of this 
result is that fallout from the ‘dot-com bubble’ bursting served as an ‘eye-opener’, substantially 
undermining any goodwill IPO underwriters built up at the IPO.  
Finally, underwriters appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract higher 
fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision-makers. Thus satisfaction with the IPO 
outcome is associated with both a reduced likelihood of switching underwriters after the IPO and 
paying higher fees for SEO underwriting services. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I embeds our test of the behavioral model by Loughran 
and Ritter (2002) in the existing literature on IPO underpricing and issuing companies’ choice of SEO 
underwriter. Section II describes our sample and data sources. In Section III, we estimate the link 
between issuing companies’ switching decisions and our behavioral proxies. Section IV concludes. 
I. Theory and Hypotheses  
A. A Behavioral Measure of Decision-Maker Satisfaction with Underwriter Performance 
A central tenet of behavioral choice theory holds that decisions are influenced by how choices 
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are framed. Considerable evidence derived from controlled experiments supports this claim and 
suggests other systematic deviations from expected utility maximization. These findings provide the 
foundation for Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) formulation of prospect theory.3 Prospect theory 
asserts that individuals make choices under uncertainty by maximizing a value function that evaluates 
wealth changes, rather than an expected utility function that ranks choices according to the level of 
expected utility. The value function is positive and concave in the domain of positive changes (from 
the anchor level) and negative and convex in the domain of negative changes.  
Loughran and Ritter (2002) assume that the decision-maker’s initial valuation beliefs are reflected 
in the mean of the indicative price range reported in the issuing firm’s IPO registration statement. This 
belief serves as a reference point against which the gain or loss from (as opposed to the expected 
utility of) the outcome of the IPO can be assessed. The offer price for an IPO routinely differs from 
this reference point, either because the bank ‘manipulated’ the decision-maker’s expectations by low-
balling the price range, or in reflection of information revealed during marketing efforts directed at 
institutional investors. Empirically, offer prices appear only to ‘partially adjust’ (Hanley (1993)) in the 
sense that large positive revisions from the reference point are associated with large initial price 
increases from the offer price during the first day of trading. Such partial adjustment is consistent with 
both the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) information-acquisition model of IPO underpricing and 
Loughran and Ritter’s complacency argument. 
Decision-makers in IPO firms are further assumed to distinguish between losses associated with 
“money left on the table” in the form of positive initial returns and the perceived gains (or losses) 
reflected in the difference between the first-day closing price and the mean of the indicative price 
range. Applied in the context of the prospect theory value function, this form of mental accounting 
(Thaler (1980, 1985)) leads to gains and losses being valued separately (segregated) or jointly 
(integrated) depending on which yields the highest net value. The convexity of the value function for 
                                                           
3 See Shefrin and Statman (1984) for a discussion of prospect theory in a financial-markets context. 
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negative wealth changes implies that decision makers will integrate two related losses. Concavity of 
the value function in the positive domain implies that two related gains will be segregated. Whether 
the combination of a loss and a gain will be integrated or segregated depends on their relative size.  
The decision-making unit in this setting is the CEO of the issuing firm or a management group 
that might include other influential members such as a venture capitalist. It is safe to assume that the 
decision-maker has an equity stake in the firm, a varying fraction (in a cross-section of firms) of 
which is sold in the IPO. Thus the decision-maker perceives a positive revision from the reference 
point as a wealth gain (assuming he retains shares after the IPO). At the same time, a positive initial 
return is perceived as a wealth loss under the assumption that shares could have been sold at the 
higher first-day trading price. Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that the decision-maker integrates 
gains and losses and thus judges the outcome of the IPO according to its net effect if  
 [shares retainedi + secondary shares soldi][OP – midpoint] + shares retainedi[P – OP]  
> [P – OP][secondary shares soldi + primary shares sold(shares retainedi/shares retained)] (1) 
where subscript i indexes the decision-maker, secondary shares sold refers to the number of personal 
shares sold by the decision-maker in the IPO, OP is the offer price, midpoint is the mean of the 
indicative price range (the anchor value), P is the closing price for the first day of trading, primary 
shares are newly issued stock sold in the IPO, and the unsubscripted value of shares retained 
represents total retention among all initial shareholders.  
In words, expression (1) states that a perceived gain arising from a positive revision to the 
reference point and an actual loss associated with selling shares subject to a positive initial return will 
be integrated and thus viewed with positive net value if the decision-maker’s share of the perceived 
underpricing loss is smaller than his perceived gain from the positive revision relative to the reference 
point. Loughran and Ritter (2002) use Netscape’s 1995 IPO to illustrate expression (1). James Clark, 
Netscape’s co-founder, saw the value of his 9.34 million shares increase from $121 million, 
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valued at the midpoint of the indicative price range, to $544 million on the first day of trading. At the 
same time, $43 million of the $151 million ‘left on the table’ in the form of underpriced stock came 
out of his pocket. According to expression (1) the good news more than made up for the bad news and 
so the two outcomes would be integrated. Accordingly, this should have left Mr. Clark satisfied with 
the overall outcome of the IPO, rather than disappointed with the underwriter for leaving $43 million 
of his money on the table.  
Expression (1) suggests a crude proxy for the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with the 
performance of the issuing firm’s investment banker. Assuming price revisions and initial returns are 
perceived as Loughran and Ritter (2002) conjecture and that the decision-maker mentally integrates 
gains and losses consistent with a value function of the form described above, expression (1) yields 
both a binary indicator of whether the decision-maker was satisfied with the bank’s performance and a 
dollar-valued measure of the degree of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction). The binary indicator equals 
one if condition (1) is true – that is, if the perceived gain arising from the positive revision to the 
reference point exceeds the actual underpricing loss – and zero otherwise. The dollar-valued measure 
computes the net perceived gain, that is, the left-hand side of condition (1) less the right-hand side. 
The test we propose establishes a null hypothesis of a direct relation between the IPO decision-
maker’s probability of choosing the IPO underwriter to manage subsequent securities market 
transactions and the decision-maker’s satisfaction with the bank’s performance in the IPO. The 
explicit structure for the behavioral proxies implied by (1) is not consistent with expected utility 
maximization, for it assumes decision-makers put weight on something that is meaningless in a 
rational framework: the perceived change in wealth relative to the reference point. Thus with 
sufficient control over the alternative potential influences on subsequent decisions (reviewed in the 
following subsection), the specific characterization of prospect theory implied by (1) is refutable. 
B. Related Work 
 
A substantial body of theory suggests that, other things equal, firms develop relationships with 
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financial intermediaries as a means of preserving strategic advantage in product markets and 
conserving resources devoted to information production when issuers are privately informed about 
their quality (see Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Boot and Thakor (2000), Anand and Galetovic 
(2000)). Despite such considerations, firms frequently do not retain their IPO underwriter for 
subsequent capital market transactions. However, the most widely cited empirical analysis of firms 
that switch underwriters at their first SEO (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)) suggests that the 
switching decision is not driven by dissatisfaction with underwriter performance during the IPO. 
Switchers actually suffer less IPO underpricing than non-switchers in their sample.  
Existing theories of IPO underpricing driven by informational frictions do not obviously predict an 
inverse relation between underpricing and satisfaction with the underwriting bank’s performance. 
From Rock’s (1986) perspective, the underwriter is not accountable for the structural failure in the 
primary market that gives rise to underpricing. Research stemming from Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) suggests that banks should be held accountable for the degree of underpricing but only 
conditional on, at least, the state of the market’s information structure and the bargaining power of 
investor constituencies. Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002) admit potential for conflicts of interest 
between the issuer and underwriter (Baron (1982)) and reach a conclusion open to similar 
interpretation. Among the empirical studies in this area, the work of Nanda and Yun (1997) is 
noteworthy for the finding that overpricing (negative initial returns) is costly to underwriters in the 
sense that their own stock market valuations decline.  
Other determinants of the decision to switch underwriters can be organized into three groups. 
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) suggest that issuers seek to ‘graduate’ to more reputable 
underwriters. In a related vein, Carter (1992) investigates why firms raise equity following their IPO 
and finds that, conditional on reissuing, the likelihood of switching underwriters decreases in the IPO 
underwriter’s reputation. A second determinant of the switching decision suggested by previous work 
reflects the issuer’s interest in having its stock covered by a reputable research analyst. Krigman, 
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Shaw, and Womack provide both statistical and survey evidence on this point. Cliff and Denis (2003) 
investigate whether issuers indirectly compensate the underwriter for research coverage by tolerating 
greater underpricing. Finally, Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2003) argue that underwriters and 
issuers engage in ‘positive assortive matching’ whereby counter-parties mutually seek partners of 
similar quality or repute. For our purposes, the primary point of interest is the implication that issuers 
experiencing a decline in quality between their IPO and first SEO are more likely to switch.  
II. Sample and Data 
A. The IPO Sample 
The sample consists of all firms completing an initial public offering in the U.S. between January 
1993 and December 2000. Closing the sample period at year-end 2000 provides at least 33 months for 
any sample firm to return to the market using September 30, 2003 as the latest date for identifying a 
subsequent equity offering. Thomson Financial’s SDC database lists 3,435 completed IPOs during 
1993-2000, after excluding unit offers, closed-end funds and REITs, ADRs of companies already 
listed in their home countries, limited partnerships, penny stocks (IPOs with offer prices below $5), 
and financial firms (SIC codes 60-69).  
As condition (1) makes clear, the behavioral proxies for issuer satisfaction require data on pre-IPO 
ownership and at-IPO sales, which we collect from IPO prospectuses. After May 1996, most 
prospectuses are available on the S.E.C.’s EDGAR service. Missing prospectuses, and those filed 
before May 1996, are obtained from Disclosure’s Global Access system (now called Thomson 
Research). We lack prospectuses for nine of the 3,435 sample IPOs. 
Closing prices for the first day of trading are obtained from the CRSP database. For the 49 sample 
firms not covered in CRSP within three days of their offer dates, first-day closing prices reported by 
SDC are checked against the share price database provided at nasdaq.com. Gaps in SDC coverage of 
company founding dates are filled with information from the issuer’s prospectus. Firms identified by 
SDC as 0-3 years old at the IPO are cross-checked since SDC frequently reports the most recent 
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incorporation date rather than the date when operations commenced.4  
B. Identifying Seasoned Equity Offers 
Our test focuses strictly on decisions related to the issuer’s first post-IPO equity offering under the 
assumption that the residual influence of the IPO experience decays rapidly with subsequent equity 
offerings.5 Matching IPO and SEO firms is a non-trivial task as a consequence of frequent name and 
CUSIP changes. SDC assigns a unique company identification code to each issuer which generally 
remains constant when the firm’s name or CUSIP changes. The SDC code identifies 1,093 first-time 
SEOs completed before September 30, 2003 by firms in the 1993-2000 IPO cohort. I.R.S. tax 
numbers provide a second, generally stable, identification code. This approach yields an additional 75 
SEOs for our IPO cohort. Finally, we perform a name match by hand and identify a further 35 first-
time SEOs in cases where both the SDC and I.R.S. identification codes changed. In sum, 1,203 of the 
3,435 firms in our IPO cohort completed a first SEO between 1993 and September 30, 2003.6 
The more time elapses between the IPO and the SEO, the less likely it is that an issuer’s choice of 
SEO underwriter is influenced by events at the time of the IPO. The median SEO occurred 391 
calendar days after the IPO. The distribution is right-skewed with a mean of 588 days. Among those 
returning to the equity market, 167 IPO firms (13.9%) did so more than three years after their IPO. 
Following Cliff and Denis (2003) (but in contrast to Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)) these ‘late’ 
SEOs are retained in the sample and the time-to-SEO is controlled directly in the empirical analysis. 
Excluding late SEO issuers from the sample yields virtually identical results.  
Table I provides summary statistics for the entire sample of IPO firms and for those that 
                                                           
4 For IPOs of corporate divisions, we attempted to determine the date when the division commenced operations. This date 
normally preceded the date of the division’s incorporation. In roll-ups and similar acquisition-based IPOs, the issuer’s 
founding date is the earliest founding date of any of its constituent firms. 
5 Excluding subsequent debt offerings avoids confounding switching decisions that arise not from dissatisfaction with the 
IPO underwriting effort but from differences in debt and equity capabilities within banks. On the other hand, this approach 
leaves open the possibility of switches that reflect a relationship nurtured over the course of multiple intervening debt 
offerings rather than dissatisfaction with the IPO underwriter. However, only 54 sample companies issue bonds between 
their IPO and their first SEO, and controlling explicitly for these intervening debt offerings leaves our results unchanged. 
6 Cliff and Dennis (2003) identify 1,050 SEOs completed by December 31, 2001 for the same cohort of IPOs completed in 
1993-2000. Over their time period, we identify an additional 89 first-time SEOs as a result of matching on I.R.S. tax 
numbers and company names.  
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subsequently raise equity and those that do not. The decision to raise additional equity is not random. 
If it is driven by factors that also affect the choice of underwriter, selection bias can arise. Table I 
reports tests of differences in characteristics across the two sub-samples to establish whether a formal 
Heckman correction for selection bias is called for.  
The first block of summary statistics indicates that the reissuing firms had greater intended (filing) 
and actual offer proceeds and were older at the time of the IPO, consistent with prior findings in the 
literature. More importantly for our purposes, the two sub-groups do not differ in terms of the first-
day return or the offer price revision from the mean of the indicative price range reported in the 
issuer’s registration statement. The second block of summary statistics shows that follow-on issuers 
were significantly more profitable and larger at the time of their IPO (measured by either pre-IPO 
revenue or book value of assets). The third block suggests that follow-on issuers engaged more 
prestigious IPO underwriters (based on Jay Ritter’s update to the Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter 
‘tombstone’ rankings). Finally, the fourth block of summary statistics reveals few significant 
differences in ownership structure, except that follow-on issuers had somewhat lower CEO 
ownership, were more often venture-backed at their IPO, and more frequently saw their insiders7 and 
venture backers sell stock in the IPO.  
In sum, companies completing follow-on equity offers raised more money at the IPO, were larger 
and more profitable, used more prestigious IPO underwriters, and were more often venture-backed. 
Importantly, there are few significant differences among the key elements of the behavioral proxy for 
issuer satisfaction – ownership, retention, price revisions relative to the filing range, and initial returns 
– suggesting that selection bias is not a serious problem in the data.8  
                                                           
7 Prospectuses report the aggregate stake held by all directors and executive officers as a group, whom we refer to 
collectively as insiders. 
8 Our main findings are robust to formally modeling the decision to raise follow-on equity using the probit version of 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step model, where the decision to reissue is modeled as a function of the intended size of the IPO, 
a dummy variable identifying firms in ‘nascent’ industries (see Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) for how 
this is coded), and year effects. Firms raising larger amounts at the IPO and those in nascent industries are likely to have 
larger capital needs, and so are more likely to reissue, which is indeed the case. However, a likelihood ratio test cannot 
reject the null that the decisions to reissue and to switch underwriters are independent at the 5% level of significance.  
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C. Coding Switches 
The sample period witnessed numerous mergers among investment banks and acquisitions of 
investment banks by commercial banks. Against this background, firms are identified as switching 
banks when the IPO lead manager, or relevant successor entity, is not chosen to lead-manage the first 
SEO. Successor entities are identified using the information in Corwin and Schultz (2003) and 
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003). For instance, a firm taken public by Dean Witter that 
subsequently hired Morgan Stanley Dean Witter as SEO underwriter is classified as a non-switcher. 
The 22 firms with multiple lead-managers at the IPO are classified as switchers only when they do not 
rehire at least one of their IPO managers. Using this classification scheme, 432 (35.9%) of the 1,203 
IPO firms carrying out their first SEO by September 30, 2003 switched underwriters. Cliff and Denis 
(2003) report a 33.5% switching rate for the same IPO cohort (though over a shorter window) and 
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) report a 30% switching rate for an IPO cohort from 1993-1995.  
D. The Behavioral Measure of Satisfaction with IPO Underwriter Performance 
We use condition (1) to code both a binary and a dollar-valued behavioral proxy for issuer 
satisfaction. The binary version equals one if condition (1) is true – that is, if the perceived gain 
arising from the positive offer price revision exceeds the actual loss due to underpricing – and zero 
otherwise. The dollar-valued version computes the perceived gain net of the underpricing loss.  
Table II provides summary statistics for the behavioral proxies. From the perspective of the CEO 
as the decision-maker, 58.9% of the SEO issuers are classified as having been satisfied with the 
performance of their IPO underwriter. Among those switching underwriters, only 48.8% are classified 
as satisfied while for those that continued their relationship with their IPO underwriter 64.5% are 
classified as satisfied with the underwriter’s performance in the IPO. The dollar-valued version of the 
proxy tells a similar story. The mean (median) non-switching CEO enjoyed a perceived wealth gain of 
$21.5m ($0.7m) at the IPO, compared to $3.1m ($0m) among switchers. Each of the differences 
between switchers and non-switchers is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Focusing on the CEO as the decision-making unit makes sense only if the CEO does not change 
between the IPO and the SEO. For the sample at hand, 89.9% of CEOs retain their job at the time of 
the SEO.9 The incumbency rate is significantly higher among non-switchers (96%) than among 
switchers (86.6%) suggesting that a newly appointed CEO selects the SEO underwriter unencumbered 
by perceptions of performance in the IPO. The multivariate analyses reported in Section III will 
control for CEO retention. 
Broadening the focus to include all directors and executive officers in addition to the CEO yields 
qualitatively identical results. Similarly, evaluating condition (1) using the holdings of venture 
capitalists (conditional on VC backing), VCs for non-switchers are more frequently satisfied with the 
IPO outcome and enjoy significantly greater perceived net wealth gains than VCs for switchers. On 
the surface, this is surprising if one starts from the premise that venture capitalists, because they are 
frequent participants in the IPO process, should be less prone to behavioral biases than CEOs for 
whom the experience is unique. We give further scrutiny to this feature of the data in Section III. 
The remainder of Table II summarizes the characteristics of the four elements of satisfaction that 
make up condition (1): the decision-maker’s ownership stake, the amount of stock sold or retained, 
price revisions relative to the filing range, and initial returns. Pre-IPO ownership stakes and selling 
behavior at the IPO differ little across the switching and non-switching sub-samples. The only 
differences that are statistically significant are the CEO’s mean pre-IPO equity stake, which is 22.7% 
for switchers and 19.3% for non-switchers, and the lower incidence of selling by directors and 
executive officers as a group among switchers. All else equal, CEOs with larger shareholdings are 
more likely to be satisfied with the IPO outcome because large shareholdings increase the left-hand 
side of condition (1). Thus larger ownership stakes among switchers bias against finding support for a 
behavioral interpretation.  
                                                           
9 There are 33 cases where the CEO was replaced but instead of leaving the firm became chairman of the board. We code 
these as CEO changes, though our results are wholly unaffected if we treat them as CEO retentions.  
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Consistent with the findings of Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) and Cliff and Denis (2003), 
switchers suffer significantly less underpricing than non-switchers on average (15.4% vs. 33.3%). 
Thus more severe underpricing alone is not likely to drive the switching decision. On the other hand, 
when switches occur banks may be perceived as having failed to deliver an increase in perceived 
wealth since the deviation of the offer price from the assumed anchor valuation averages -2.5% for 
switchers compared to +6.6% for non-switchers.  
E. Other Control Variables 
Prior empirical work suggests a number of reasons why firms switch underwriters. Chief among 
these are the ‘graduation’ and ‘strategic analyst coverage’ effects. The former posits that firms switch 
if they can persuade a more prestigious bank to underwrite their SEO. The latter suggests that firms 
switch either because they are dissatisfied with the amount, timeliness, or quality of the IPO 
underwriter’s research output, or to obtain coverage from a more highly ranked sell-side analyst.  
The summary statistics in Table III confirm the empirical importance of these effects. Switching 
firms are taken public by significantly less prestigious underwriters (6.9 vs. 8.2 on the nine-point 
Carter-Manaster reputation scale). The Carter-Manaster score for the bank hired to underwrite the 
SEO by a switching firm is 7.6, reflecting graduation to more prestigious underwriters on average. 
Among the 432 switching firms, 216 (50%) hired more reputable underwriters to manage their SEO. 
We examine the issuer’s interest in acquiring analyst coverage by defining coverage as having one 
of the bank’s analysts publish at least one research report on the issuer in the two years prior to the 
SEO.10 Our main source of coverage information is I/B/E/S. Where I/B/E/S indicates that a particular 
bank did not cover a given sample firm’s stock, we ran cross-checks using the Investext collection of 
analyst reports available online (since 1996) and the news sources available in Factiva (before 1996). 
Table III shows that 89.7% of non-switchers receive coverage from their IPO underwriters. When 
post-IPO coverage is not provided, IPO underwriters are particularly vulnerable to loss of future 
                                                           
10 The results are robust to using a one-year window instead. 
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underwriting mandates. Only 66.4% of switchers received coverage from their IPO underwriter prior 
to their first SEO. This coverage rate is statistically different from the 89.7% coverage rate among 
non-switchers. On the other hand, issuers don’t obviously reward ‘pre-emptive’ coverage by 
switching underwriters. Among switching firms, only 45.6% received coverage prior to the SEO by 
the bank chosen to underwrite the SEO. (Though one might presume that the underwriting mandate 
carried an implicit expectation that coverage would begin following the deal, as in fact it often did.) 
Indeed, there are only 54 cases (out of 432) in which the SEO underwriter provided pre-SEO coverage 
while the IPO underwriter did not.  
The prior year’s all-star analyst rankings published in the October issue of Institutional Investor 
magazine provide a natural proxy for analyst quality or reputation. IPO underwriters more frequently 
lose follow-on business when their analyst covering the issuer’s stock is not an Institutional Investor 
all-star (defined as a top 3 or runner-up analyst). However, conditional on the issuer switching 
underwriters, the frequency with which the SEO underwriter employs an all-star analyst to cover the 
issuer’s stock is not statistically different from that of the IPO underwriter (10% and 11.1%, 
respectively). Moreover, the SEO bank employed an all-star analyst while the IPO bank did not in 
only 30 cases (out of 432). 
Finally, we investigate whether the aggressiveness of a bank’s analyst recommendations 
influenced switching decisions. Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003) define an analyst’s relative 
recommendation as the level of her most recent I/B/E/S recommendation in the two years prior to the 
SEO less the median recommendation of other analysts (i.e. ‘consensus’) during the same window. 
This measure ranges between –4 and +4, with positive values indicating relatively more aggressive 
recommendations. By this measure, IPO underwriters’ recommendations for non-switchers were 
conservative (with an average value of -0.04) relative to those provided for switchers (0.19) and 
statistically different at the 1% level. Moreover, switching firms chose banks whose analysts were not 
only significantly less aggressive than their IPO banks’ analysts, but conservative on average (-
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0.08 vs. 0.19). These univariate results are consistent with the broader results reported in Ljungqvist, 
Marston, and Wilhelm suggesting that aggressive analyst behavior neither helps banks retain old 
clients nor win new ones. 
In addition to underwriter quality and analyst behavior, prior work has controlled for firm 
characteristics. The third and fourth blocks of Table III illustrate that switchers raised a little less 
money at their IPO and were significantly younger and smaller (as measured by revenue and assets), 
though they were no more or less profitable at the time of their IPO than non-switchers.11  
III. Empirical Results  
We now relate our behavioral proxies to issuing companies’ decision whether or not to rehire their 
IPO underwriter to lead-manage their first follow-on equity offering. In controlling for the 
‘graduation’ and ‘strategic analyst coverage’ effects, the literature on SEO switching decisions often 
estimates logit or probit models that include on the right-hand side variables capturing the 
characteristics of both the IPO underwriter and the SEO underwriter. For instance, Krigman, Shaw, 
and Womack (2001) relate switching decisions to the net change in underwriter reputation. This is 
problematic. The characteristics of the bank that an issuer switches to are observed only if there is a 
switch, and so they are effectively interacted with the dependent variable. For instance, the net change 
in underwriter reputation is nonzero only if a switch has taken place. Any variable that is zero by 
definition among non-switchers is a perfect predictor of the switching decision, violating the classical 
identification assumptions. In such a setting, spurious explanatory power may be attributed to the 
‘graduation’ and ‘strategic analyst coverage’ variables. 
There are two solutions to this specification problem. First, we can estimate probit models that do 
not condition on information that mechanically covaries with the choice being modeled. This implies 
                                                           
11 Firm characteristics that have been shown empirically not to influence the switching decision include share turnover, the 
amount of flipping on the first day of trading, and the fee paid to the IPO underwriter (see Cliff and Denis (2003) and 
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)). We thus do not include these in our analysis. Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt 
(2003) proxy for firm quality using the volatility of pre-SEO stock returns and a dummy for distressed delistings. Neither 
is significantly related to the switching decision in our sample. 
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conditioning only on the IPO underwriter’s characteristics such as its prestige and provision of analyst 
services. We estimate such models in Sections III.A through III.C. The conditional logit model 
associated with McFadden’s (1974) choice problem provides an alternative enabling us to also 
condition on the characteristics of the banks to which an issuer may consider switching. Conditional 
logit results are reported in Section III.D. The probit and conditional logit results agree with regard to 
the effect of our behavioral proxies on the switching decision, while they differ somewhat in the 
estimated effects of bank characteristics. 
A. Benchmarking with the Existing Literature 
Column 1 in Table IV benchmarks our findings against those in the literature. It relates the 
switching decision to firm and offer characteristics as well as the characteristics of the bank 
underwriting the issuer’s IPO, but not the prospect theory proxies. The overall explanatory power of 
the model is good, in view of the pseudo R2 of 23.5%. The results broadly support the ‘graduation’ 
and ‘strategic analyst’ hypotheses. 
Consistent with Cliff and Denis (2003) but in contrast to Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2003), the 
probability of switching underwriters at the first SEO is related neither to the size of the IPO nor the 
firm’s age when going public. Only one proxy for firm quality, which we borrow from Fernando, 
Gatchev, and Spindt (2003), has a significant effect on the switching decision: firms with positive 
earnings per share as of the end of the fiscal year of their SEO are less likely to switch underwriters 
(p=0.002).12 In common with all prior work, we find that firms are less likely to switch underwriters, 
the more IPO underpricing they experienced (p=0.026). The effect is large in economic magnitude. A 
one standard deviation increase in log initial returns decreases the predicted switching probability 
from 33.1% to 27.6%, holding all other covariates at their sample means. As conjectured, we also find 
that the switching probability increases in the log time that has elapsed since the IPO (p<0.001).  
                                                           
12 We have verified that this is a levels effect: the change in EPS relative to the last twelve months prior to the IPO has no 
bearing on the switching decision. We have also tried other controls for firm quality. For instance, log issuer returns in 
excess of the CRSP value-weighted Nasdaq index, computed over a variety of pre-SEO windows, have no statistically 
significant effect in our data. 
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Among bank characteristics, issuers are less likely to switch, the more reputable the IPO 
underwriter (p<0.001) and when the IPO underwriter provides research coverage ahead of the SEO 
(p<0.001).13 Economically, these are the two most significant determinants of issuers’ switching 
decisions. In contrast, the effect of the IPO underwriter’s analyst carrying an all-star ranking, while 
negative as conjectured by Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), is not statistically significant 
(p=0.161). (It is worth noting that had we instead followed Krigman, Shaw, and Womack by including 
the net gains in underwriter prestige, research coverage, and all-star analysts in this probit model, we 
would have found all three to be negatively and significantly related to the switching decision.) 
B. Controlling for Decision-Maker Satisfaction  
Column 2 provides results from estimation of the same model but including the binary version of 
the behavioral proxy for decision-maker satisfaction. In this case, the CEO is taken as the decision-
maker. While the general fit of the model only improves a little, two results stand out. First, the 
behavioral proxy is inversely related to the likelihood of switching underwriters. The effect is large in 
economic magnitude: all else equal, CEOs are 7.9% less likely to switch underwriters at the first SEO 
when they are satisfied, according to condition (1), with the outcome of their IPO (p=0.024). Second, 
the effect of IPO underpricing on the issuer’s switching decision is no longer statistically significant. 
Thus, a natural interpretation of the seemingly perverse negative relation between underpricing and 
the likelihood of switching underwriters is that it reflects an omitted variables bias associated with the 
failure to control for the decision-maker’s exposure to and/or perception of an apparent wealth loss.  
The model shown in column 3 uses the alternative dollar-valued specification of the behavioral 
proxy for satisfaction, in a logarithmic transformation.14 The greater their perceived wealth gain, the 
less likely are CEOs to switch underwriters (p=0.015). The effect is again large economically: a one 
                                                           
13 To ensure comparability with extant models of the switching decision, we do not control for the strength of the IPO 
underwriter’s analyst recommendation. This does not affect our results. Consistent with Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 
(2003), we find that firms are more likely to switch, the more aggressive their IPO underwriter’s recommendation. 
14 Since the dollar-valued version of the behavioral proxy can be zero or negative, we transform it such that it equals 
ln(1+X) if X≥0 and –ln(1–X) if X<0. This transform is commonly used in accounting research.  
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standard deviation increase in this proxy is associated with a decrease in the predicted switching 
probability from 33.2% to 28.9%, holding all other covariates at their sample means. The effect is 
about one third of the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the IPO underwriter’s Carter-
Manaster rank, the economically largest determinant of the switching decision in our models.  
The results reported in columns 4 and 5 indicate robustness to broadening the decision-making 
unit to include all directors and executive officers (in addition to the CEO). The estimated coefficients 
are somewhat larger economically and stronger statistically. The only alternative specification of the 
decision-making unit to which the results are sensitive is that which treats the venture capitalist as the 
main decision-maker for VC-backed IPOs, reported in columns 6 and 7. Neither the binary nor the 
dollar-valued proxy for the VCs’ satisfaction with the IPO has a significant effect on the switching 
decision. Given their regular participation in the IPO process, VCs may be less inclined toward 
behavioral biases. Alternatively, VCs may not be particularly influential in the selection of an 
underwriter subsequent to the IPO.  
C. Assessing the Plausibility of the Behavioral Interpretation  
Recall that for 89.9% of the sample issuers, the CEO does not change from the IPO to the SEO. 
The cases in which the CEO leaves the company provide a natural experiment for examining the 
plausibility of our interpretation of the behavioral proxies. In such cases, the behavioral proxies for 
satisfaction with the IPO do not reflect the experience of the current decision-maker and thus there is 
no obvious prediction of a relation between these proxies and the decision to switch underwriters at 
the SEO. As the results in Table V show, this is indeed the case. For those cases in which the CEO 
changes between the IPO and SEO, the behavioral proxies for satisfaction have a much smaller and 
statistically insignificant effect on the decision to switch underwriters (p=0.809 for the binary proxy 
and p=0.870 for the dollar-valued specification). Instead, the probability of switching is related to the 
issuer’s quality and the absence of research coverage from the IPO underwriter.  
Arguably, a CEO may be less prone to behavioral biases, the more experienced and skilled he 
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is. To examine this conjecture, we hand-collect biographical information for all CEOs still in post at 
the time of the SEO. IPO prospectuses disclose CEO age, employment history, and membership of 
other companies’ boards. Frequently, they also disclose educational background, though this is not 
mandatory. In Table VI, we sort CEOs into those who had been CEO of another firm prior to joining 
the sample company (‘experienced’ CEOs) and those who had not. It is conceivable that experience 
measured in this way is correlated with higher liquid net wealth. Among the 250 ‘experienced’ CEOs, 
our behavioral proxies do not influence the likelihood of a switch (see columns 1 and 3). Instead, the 
effect of the behavioral proxies is concentrated among the less experienced CEOs (see columns 2 and 
4). Similar results obtain when we sort by prior board experience or whether the CEO had previously 
founded another company (not shown).  
In columns 5 through 8 of Table VI, we sort CEOs according to their educational background. For 
CEOs who hold a postgraduate degree (PhD, MD, JD, MA, MS, or MBA), we find no significant 
relation between the behavioral proxies and the switching decision. However, just over half the CEOs 
do not disclose their educational background, so this result must be interpreted with caution. 
IPO underpricing reached extreme levels during the ‘dot-com bubble’ of 1999 and early 2000 (see 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)). Nevertheless, condition (1) classifies a majority of issuers in those 
years as satisfied due to the predominantly positive and unusually large price revisions they 
experienced. The bursting of the ‘dot-com bubble’ in the second quarter of 2000 was followed by 
allegations of investment bank wrong-doing. For instance, investment bankers had in some cases 
allocated heavily underpriced stock to executives at other firms in the hope of winning their future 
underwriting business, a practice known as spinning. Such revelations, combined with often extreme 
share price collapses, could arguably have served as ‘eye-openers’, reversing an issuer’s positive 
perception of the IPO outcome as captured by our behavioral proxies. If so, we would expect the 
behavioral proxies to have little explanatory power following the bursting of the ‘bubble’. 
In Table VII, we interact the behavioral proxies with a dummy variable identifying firms that 
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went public during the ‘bubble’ period (1999Q1 to 2000Q2) and completed their SEO after the 
‘bubble’ burst. For both versions of the proxy, the interaction effect is positive, attenuating the 
negative effect of satisfaction on the switching decision, and at least marginally significant. Overall, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the combined effect through the behavioral proxy itself and the 
interaction term is zero for SEOs completed after the second quarter of 2000 (p=0.506 and p=0.437 
for the binary and dollar-valued measure, respectively). One plausible interpretation of this result is 
that fallout from the ‘dot-com bubble’ bursting substantially undermined any goodwill IPO 
underwriters built up during this period. 
An alternative interpretation of the behavioral proxies is that they merely capture the effect of the 
underwriter’s bookbuilding activities. Perhaps decision-makers interpret positive revisions in the 
value of their offerings (which occur when OP – midpoint > 0) as evidence of the underwriter’s skill 
in placing their stock with investors who are willing to pay the most for it. Retaining such an 
underwriter for follow-on offers could thus be entirely rational. To see if this is driving our results, we 
include proceeds revisions alongside our two behavioral proxies. These are highly correlated (the 
Spearman rank correlations exceed 70%) so we expect standard errors to increase. The results are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table VII. The coefficients estimated for proceeds revisions are never 
significant, whereas we continue to find a negative effect on the switching probability from both the 
binary (p=0.10) and the dollar-valued version (p=0.022) of the behavioral proxy.15  
In summary, the results reported in Tables IV through VII are broadly consistent with the 
interpretation of the behavioral proxies as measures of decision-maker satisfaction. Treating the CEO 
as the key decision-maker yields the conclusion that satisfaction with the outcome of the IPO 
diminishes the likelihood of switching underwriters at the SEO. This result does not hold in cases 
where the CEO changes following the IPO or under a specification that treats venture capitalists as the 
relevant decision-making unit. The result is characteristic of normal market conditions and is reversed 
                                                           
15 Similar results obtain if we use price revisions instead of proceeds revisions. 
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following the bursting of the ‘dot-com bubble’ in 2000Q2. 
D. A Conditional Logit Specification Controlling for Decision-Maker Satisfaction  
The probit results reported so far do not control for the characteristics of banks competing with the 
IPO underwriter to lead-manage the SEO. It is therefore conceivable that our behavioral proxies pick 
up the effect of these omitted variables, though exactly why they should be related is not obvious a 
priori. To investigate this possibility further, we estimate conditional logit models of the issuer’s 
choice among competing banks.  
We assume issuers choose their SEO lead-manager from among a set of two banks: the IPO 
underwriter and a ‘new bank’. Which new bank? Where a switch has taken place, we assume that the 
chosen bank is the one that maximizes the issuer’s utility. Under the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives axiom, we can ignore for estimation purposes all the other banks that could have been but 
were not chosen. If no switch has taken place, we must specify an alternative choice of bank. Since we 
do not observe which banks an issuer considered, we model three scenarios that differ in the 
characteristics (i.e. prestige, research coverage, and analyst reputation) attributed to the alternative 
bank. Specifically, we assume that the alternative bank has the same characteristics as either 1) the 
IPO underwriter, 2) the average bank, or 3) the best bank. Scenario 1) assumes that the best available 
alternative for a non-switcher was no better than its IPO underwriter. It thus examines the influence of 
the issuer’s attributes, including our behavioral proxies, holding the issuer on its indifference curve 
with respect to bank characteristics. The parameters for scenario 2) are a Carter-Manaster rank of 
7.25, no research coverage, and the absence of an all-star analyst. For scenario 3), they are a rank of 
9.1 (the highest possible), coverage, and the presence of an all-star analyst. 
Let yij be an indicator variable for issuer i’s actual choice. Issuers can choose between the IPO 
underwriter (j=1) and another bank (j=2) such that yij=1 if issuer i chooses bank j, and zero otherwise. 
Thus for every issuer i we have a tuplet {yi1, yi2} that either equals {1,0} or {0,1}. The tuplet {0,1} 
corresponds to switching underwriters. We relate the probability of observing these choices to two 
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classes of variables: attributes of the choices available to the ith issuer and attributes of the ith issuer. 
Our set of choice attributes includes three variables: the prestige of the bank measured using the 
Carter-Manaster tombstone rankings, a dummy equaling 1 if the bank’s analyst covered the issuer’s 
stock at any time during the two years prior to the SEO, and a dummy equaling 1 if the analyst was an 
all-star at the time. Note that these variables vary with the choice made. For instance, a representative 
tuplet of the banks’ Carter-Manaster tombstone rankings for issuer i might be {5,9}.  
Our set of issuer attributes consists of the five firm and offer characteristics included in our probit 
models, plus our behavioral proxies. Note that while issuer attributes vary across issuers, they are 
constant for each issuer whichever bank is chosen. Conditional logit models estimate the effect of 
issuer attributes by interacting such variables with a dummy for the choice in hand.16 Clearly, with 
only two choices, it does not matter whether we use choice 1 or its complement, choice 2. We interact 
the issuer attributes with a dummy identifying the new bank (j=2). The coefficients are interpreted as 
estimates of the effect of issuer attributes on the likelihood that the issuer switches banks.  
Table VIII presents the results. For each of the three scenarios, we estimate two specifications, 
using either the binary or the dollar-valued behavioral proxy. The issuer attributes have similar effects 
across all six models. In contrast to our probit results, we find that firms with larger IPOs are 
significantly less likely to hire a new bank for their SEO (they are less likely to switch). We also find 
some evidence that older IPO firms are less likely to switch (in Scenarios 1 and 2). As before, firms 
are less likely to switch if they have positive EPS at the time of the SEO, the more IPO underpricing 
they suffered (except in Scenario 2), and the less time has elapsed since the IPO.  
The effects of the attributes of the choice (i.e. the bank characteristics) vary across the scenarios, 
that is, depending on who we assume the alternative bank to be. In scenarios 1) and 2), a bank is more 
likely to be chosen the higher its Carter-Manaster ranking. Providing research coverage is beneficial 
only in Scenario 2); in the other scenarios, a bank is actually less likely to be chosen when it provides 
                                                           
16 See Greene (2003), p. 720. 
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coverage. While counterintuitive, this finding confirms the univariate result in Table III suggesting 
that conditional on switching, firms choose banks that are less likely to provide coverage than their 
IPO underwriter (with a coverage rate of 45.6% vs. 66.4%). Having an all-star analyst cover the 
issuer’s stock does not affect a bank’s chances of being chosen, except in Scenario 3) where the effect 
is negative. This too is broadly consistent with Table III. 
Controlling for these effects, we find that issuers are significantly less likely to switch to a new 
bank if their CEO is classified as satisfied with the IPO outcome. This result holds for both the binary 
and the dollar-valued version of our proxy, and varies little across the three scenarios. Thus, omitting 
the characteristics of the banks an issuer may consider switching to does not appear to bias our 
inference regarding the behavioral proxies.  
E. Do Underwriters Benefit from Behavioral Biases? 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that banks underwriting IPOs stand to gain from the decision-
maker’s behavioral biases – over and above retaining the firm’s custom in the future. An obvious 
source of gain is the potential for underpricing the issuer’s stock by more than is necessary to 
complete the offering, to the benefit of institutional investors who may, in turn, share the gains with 
the bank via excess trading commissions.17 Consistent with this notion, the initial return averages 
41.4% among issuers classified as satisfied with the outcome of the IPO, as compared to 6.1% among 
the rest. Determining whether the bank actually benefits from larger initial returns requires data on its 
relationships with the institutional investors to whom IPO shares are allocated. Such data are not 
publicly available. 
Conceivably, the bank may exploit the decision-maker’s satisfaction with the IPO by charging an 
excessive fee for underwriting the follow-on equity offer. We investigate this possibility by estimating 
a standard model of the determinants of the SEO spread that additionally controls for the issuer’s 
                                                           
17 For instance, in 2002 CSFB was fined $100 million for “taking millions of dollars from customers in inflated 
commissions in exchange for allocations of ‘hot’ Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)” between April 1999 and June 2000. 
(NASD Regulation, Inc. news release dated January 22, 2002.) 
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satisfaction. Following Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), we model SEO spreads as decreasing in the 
amount raised at the SEO (in log real dollars) and firm quality (measured using the volatility of daily 
stock returns estimated over the 230 trading days ending 20 days before the SEO,18 the EPS dummy 
used earlier, and the firm’s real log market capitalization as of the month-end prior to the SEO date), 
and increasing in aggregate primary market activity (measured as the log real amount raised in all 
IPOs and SEOs in the three calendar months preceding the SEO).  
The least-squares estimates are reported in Table IX. The sample size decreases by the 24 firms 
for which prospectuses fail to report the spread paid to the SEO underwriter. The Altinkilic-Hansen 
controls confirm that SEO spreads are significantly lower for larger offers and higher-quality issuers 
(that is, those with lower volatility, positive earnings, and larger market capitalizations), and 
significantly higher the more active is the primary equity market. Controlling for these effects, column 
1 shows that SEO spreads are on average 12 basis points higher when the CEO is classified as 
satisfied with the outcome of the IPO (p=0.002). The average SEO raises $116.8 million, so satisfied 
CEOs pay an excess commission of $140,000 on average. Thus satisfaction with the IPO outcome is 
associated with both a reduced likelihood of switching underwriters for the first SEO and paying 
higher fees for SEO underwriting services.  
The model shown in column 2 uses the dollar-valued proxy for issuer satisfaction, and allows its 
slope to depend on whether the CEO is classified as satisfied with the IPO. In instances of 
dissatisfaction with the outcome, the SEO spread decreases significantly in the net dollar-valued loss 
the CEO perceived at the time of the IPO (p=0.001). When the CEO was satisfied, the SEO spread 
increases significantly (p<0.001), by about 30 basis points for a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
perceived net dollar-valued gain. These results suggest that satisfied CEOs are a soft touch for banks 
underwriting their first SEO. They do not show whether their IPO underwriter reaps benefits from 
their satisfaction because we have not distinguished between firms that switched underwriters and 
                                                           
18 As the CRSP tapes for 2003 aren’t yet available, we use share price data provided by nasdaq.com where necessary. 
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firms that did not. Models 3 and 4 re-estimate model 2 for non-switchers and switchers, respectively. 
As expected, the behavioral proxies are significant only among non-switchers.  
IV. Conclusion 
We develop a behavioral proxy for the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with an IPO 
underwriter’s performance. The proxy is derived directly from the prospect theory argument for IPO 
underpricing in Loughran and Ritter (2002). It measures whether, and to what degree, the CEO 
responsible for an IPO was ‘satisfied’ with the underwriter’s performance given the CEO’s wealth 
loss due to underpricing and his (perceived) wealth gain due to offer price revisions. We then examine 
which bank the IPO firm chooses as underwriter for its first seasoned equity offering (SEO) and test 
whether the CEO is more likely to retain the IPO underwriter to lead-manage the follow-on offer 
when the behavioral proxy indicates that he was satisfied with the IPO outcome. 
 If IPO decision-makers reveal their preferences through subsequent decisions, the plausibility of 
the underpinnings of Loughran and Ritter’s behavioral story can be examined fairly directly by this 
method. From the perspective of expected utility theory, the behavioral proxy should have no 
explanatory power. We find, however, that IPO firms are significantly more likely to switch 
underwriters after the IPO when the behavioral proxy indicates that they were dissatisfied with the 
IPO underwriter’s performance, controlling for other known factors.  
The behavioral interpretation is more plausible when the issuer’s CEO, with whom the choice of 
underwriter ultimately rests, is still in charge at the time of the SEO. Consistent with this 
interpretation, the explanatory power of our behavioral proxy is concentrated among firms that 
retained their CEOs. The effect is strongest among relatively less experienced CEOs. The result also 
holds when the behavioral proxy is measured for the group of senior executives collectively. On the 
other hand, switching behavior is not influenced by a venture capitalist’s satisfaction with the IPO 
outcome. Given their regular participation in the IPO process, VCs may be less inclined toward 
behavioral biases (or they may not be particularly influential in the underwriter selection decision 
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after the IPO). Finally, underwriters also appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that 
they extract higher fees for subsequent transactions when these involve decision-makers deemed 
satisfied.  
Our tests do not speak directly to whether and to what degree behavioral biases determine patterns 
in IPO initial returns. In the sense that the tests suggest there is explanatory power in the behavioral 
model, they do shed light on the plausibility of the underlying structure necessary for such a linkage to 
exist. An explicit characterization and test of this linkage remains a substantial challenge for future 
research.
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Table I. Descriptive Sample Statistics 
The sample consists of the 3,435 non-financial common-stock IPOs completed in the U.S. between January 1993 and 
December 2000 with offer prices of at least $5/share. Post-IPO seasoned equity offers (SEOs) are identified using three 
company identifiers: SDC company id, I.R.S. tax numbers, and company name. Filing size is the first disclosure of intended 
issue size from S.E.C. registrations. Offer size is offer price times number of shares sold (excluding the over-allotment 
option). The initial return is measured as the first-day closing price over the offer price, less one. The filing midpoint price 
is the midpoint of the first indicative price range filed with the S.E.C.  In the context of accounting data, LTM stands for the 
‘last twelve month’ accounting period prior to the IPO. We use Jay Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster (1990) ranks as a 
measure of underwriter reputation. These range from 0 to 9.1, with larger numbers denoting more prestigious banks. 
‘Insiders’ are directors and executive officers as a group, as identified in the ownership section of the IPO prospectus. VC 
backing information comes from the prospectuses and includes backing by either venture capitalists or private equity 
(middle-market, buy-out, merchant banking) funds. The test statistics reported in the last column are for t-tests of equal 
means, χ2-tests of equal medians, and Z-tests of equal proportions, as required. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
    
Subsequent SEO by 
Sept. 30, 2003?  
Test of 
equal means,
  
Whole 
sample
 
Yes 
 
No  
medians, or 
fractions 
       
Number of observations  3,435  1,203 2,232    
        
IPO filing size ($m) mean 71.8  83.5 65.5  -2.10** 
IPO offer size ($m) mean 76.3  88.3 69.8  -2.03** 
age at IPO (years) mean 14.4  15.2 14.0  -1.73* 
IPO initial return (%) mean 28.1  26.9 28.7  0.98 
price change from filing midpoint to offer (%) mean 3.9  3.3 4.1   0.91 
        
LTM revenue ($m) mean 163.5  217.9 134.1  -1.99** 
LTM revenue ($m) median 25.4  35.3 21.1  59.77*** 
pre-IPO book value of assets ($m) mean 170.9  250.9 130.4   -3.06*** 
pre-IPO book value of assets ($m) median 23.8  31.4 20.5  50.77*** 
LTM net income ($m) mean -3.9  -4.9 -3.5  0.44 
LTM net income ($m) median 0.3  0.8 0.2  13.22*** 
fraction of IPO firms w/ LTM EPS<0 (%) fraction 45.0  41.2 47.1  3.29*** 
        
IPO underwriter’s Carter-Manaster rank mean 7.3  7.7 7.0   -8.87*** 
        
CEO pre-IPO equity stake (%) mean 21.8  20.5 22.5  2.12** 
fraction of CEOs selling stock in IPO (%) fraction 12.9  13.6 12.5  -0.98 
pre-IPO insider equity stake (%) mean 62.2  61.9 62.4   0.45 
fraction of insiders selling stock in IPO (%) fraction 25.1  27.8 23.7  -2.65*** 
fraction of venture-backed IPO firms (%) fraction 51.4  57.1 48.3  4.90*** 
VCs’ pre-IPO equity stake (%) mean 39.3  39.3 39.4  0.93 
fraction of VCs selling stock in IPO (%) fraction 19.0  24.4 15.5  -4.69*** 
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Table II. The Behavioral Proxies 
A firm is classified as switching underwriters if it doesn’t rehire its IPO lead manager, or relevant successor entities, to 
lead-manage its first post-IPO seasoned equity offer (SEO). Successor entities are identified using the information in 
Corwin and Schultz (2003) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003). If the IPO was lead-managed by multiple 
banks, we deem the firm to switch underwriters if it doesn’t rehire at least one of the IPO underwriters. The fraction of 
decision-makers deemed ‘satisfied’ with the IPO outcome is computed by evaluating expression (1) in the text. The 
decision-maker’s net perceived wealth gain is computed as the left-hand side of expression (1) less the right-hand side. 
We manually inspect SEO prospectuses (and where missing proxy statements) to ascertain if the CEO in charge at the 
time of the IPO is still in charge at the time of the SEO. The final two blocks contain statistics on the same variables 
introduced in Table I. The test statistics reported in the last column are for t-tests of equal means, χ2-tests of equal 
medians, and Z-tests of equal proportions, as required. We denote significance at the 1% and 5% level by *** and **, 
respectively. 
 
    
Switching 
underwriter?  
Test of 
equal means,
  
SEO 
sample
 
Yes 
 
No  
medians, or 
fractions 
       
Number of observations  1,203  432 771    
        
% of CEOs classified as ‘satisfied’ with the IPO  fraction 58.9  48.8 64.5  5.28*** 
CEO’s net perceived wealth gain ($m) mean 14.9  3.1 21.5  3.44*** 
CEO’s net perceived wealth gain ($m) median 0.3  0.0 0.7  38.20*** 
        
fraction of CEOs still in job at time of SEO (%) fraction 89.9  83.8 93.4  5.31*** 
        
% of insiders classified as ‘satisfied’ with the IPO fraction 61.5  50.7 67.6  5.77*** 
insiders’ net perceived wealth gain ($m) mean 66.0  8.2 98.6  4.02*** 
insiders’ net perceived wealth gain ($m) median 2.1  0.1 6.1  60.00*** 
        
% of VCs classified as ‘satisfied’ with the IPO  fraction 63.2  51.3 69.1  4.54*** 
VCs’ net perceived wealth gain ($m) mean 56.8  7.4 81.6  3.90*** 
VCs’ net perceived wealth gain ($m) median 2.7  0.1 6.7  34.11*** 
        
CEO pre-IPO equity stake (%) mean 20.5  22.7 19.3  -2.24** 
fraction of CEOs selling stock in IPO (%) fraction 13.6  13.2 13.9  0.33 
pre-IPO insider equity stake (%) mean 61.9  62.9 61.3  -0.87 
fraction of insiders selling stock in IPO (%) fraction 27.8  24.3 29.7  2.01** 
fraction of venture-backed IPO firms (%) fraction 57.1  52.8 59.5  2.27** 
VCs’ pre-IPO equity stake (%) mean 39.3  40.6 38.6  -0.98 
fraction of VCs selling stock in IPO (%) fraction 24.5  25.4 24.0  -0.42 
        
IPO initial return (%) mean 26.9  15.4 33.3   6.18*** 
price change from filing midpoint to offer (%) mean 3.3  -2.5 6.6  6.86*** 
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Table III. Descriptive Statistics for Switchers and Non-Switchers 
A firm is classified as switching underwriters if it doesn’t rehire its IPO lead manager, or relevant successor entities, to 
lead-manage its first post-IPO seasoned equity offer (SEO). Successor entities are identified using the information in 
Corwin and Schultz (2003) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003). If the IPO was lead-managed by multiple banks, 
we deem the firm to switch underwriters if it doesn’t rehire at least one of the IPO underwriters. The first, third, and fourth 
blocks contain statistics on the same variables introduced in Table I. The second block relates to analyst coverage (defined 
as the analyst issuing at least one report in the two years prior to the SEO), the presence of all-star analysts (i.e. ranked 
among the top 3 or runner-up analysts by Institutional Investor magazine in its previous October issue), and the bank’s 
most recent recommendation relative to consensus (with positive numbers indicating above-consensus recommendations). 
The test statistics reported in the last column are for t-tests of equal means, χ2-tests of equal medians, and Z-tests of equal 
proportions, as required. We denote significance at the 1% and 5% level by *** and **, respectively. 
 
    
Switching 
underwriter?  
Test of 
equal means,
  
SEO 
sample
 
Yes 
 
No  
medians, or 
fractions 
Number of observations  1,203  432 771    
IPO underwriter’s Carter-Manaster rank mean 7.7  6.9 8.2  12.37*** 
SEO underwriter’s Carter-Manaster rank mean 8.0  7.6 8.2  6.16*** 
fraction w/ coverage by IPO underwriter (%) fraction 81.4  66.4 89.7  9.95*** 
fraction w/ coverage by SEO underwriter (%) fraction 73.6  45.6 89.3  16.49*** 
fraction where IPO bank’s analyst is all-star (%) fraction 19.7  11.1 24.5  5.61*** 
fraction where SEO bank’s analyst is all-star (%) fraction 19.3  10.0 24.5  6.14*** 
IPO bank’s relative recommendation mean 0.01  0.19 -0.04  -5.10*** 
SEO bank’s relative recommendation mean -0.04  -0.08 -0.03  1.01 
IPO filing size ($m) mean 83.5  66.3 93.1   1.25 
IPO offer size ($m) mean 88.3  70.5 98.3  1.22 
age at IPO (years) mean 15.2  14.0 16.0  1.60 
LTM revenue ($m) mean 217.9  264.3 191.9   -0.75 
LTM revenue ($m) median 35.3  25.7 43.3  20.67*** 
pre-IPO book value of assets ($m) mean 250.9  202.9 274.8  0.76 
pre-IPO book value of assets ($m) median 31.4  26.3 37.0  9.64*** 
LTM net income ($m) mean -4.9  3.1 -9.0   -1.46 
LTM net income ($m) median 0.8  0.6 0.9  1.69 
fraction of IPO firms w/ LTM EPS<0 (%) fraction 41.2  44.2 39.6  -1.57 
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Table IV. Probit Models of the Switching Decision 
We relate a firm’s decision whether to switch underwriters between the IPO and the first SEO to the firm and bank 
characteristics described in Table III, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reported positive earnings per share for the 
fiscal year in which the SEO took place, and our behavioral proxies from Table II. Since the dollar-valued version of the 
behavioral proxy can be zero or negative, we transform it such that it equals ln(1+X) if X≥0 and –ln(1–X) if X<0. In columns 3 
and 5, the sample size declines by six observations for which the dollar-valued proxy of issuer satisfaction cannot be computed 
due to division by zero. The models in columns 6 and 7 are estimated in the sub-sample of venture-backed IPOs. Intercepts are 
not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics. We denote significance at the 1% and 
5% level by *** and **, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: indicator = 1 if firm switches underwriter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Firm and offer characteristics         
log IPO filing size ($m) -0.002 -0.018 0.009 -0.016 0.005  0.003 0.004 
 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058  0.089 0.089 
ln(1+age at IPO) -0.054 -0.057 -0.055 -0.056 -0.055  -0.032 -0.035 
 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051  0.072 0.072 
=1 if EPS>0 -0.282*** -0.269*** -0.256*** -0.263*** -0.249***  -0.312*** -0.303***
 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.093  0.117 0.118 
ln(1+initial IPO return) -0.467** -0.255 -0.188 -0.222 -0.119  -0.247 -0.173 
 0.210 0.221 0.230 0.220 0.226  0.281 0.288 
ln(days from IPO to SEO) 0.642*** 0.646*** 0.657*** 0.648*** 0.660***  0.698*** 0.701***
 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.058  0.074 0.074 
Bank characteristics         
IPO bank’s Carter-Manaster rank -0.195*** -0.191*** -0.195*** -0.190*** -0.193***  -0.144*** -0.142***
 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033  0.051 0.051 
=1 if IPO bank covers stock -0.477*** -0.474*** -0.472*** -0.479*** -0.472***  -0.530*** -0.532***
 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.110  0.159 0.159 
=1 if IPO bank’s analyst is all-star -0.167 -0.174 -0.184 -0.171 -0.183  -0.123 -0.124 
 0.119 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.120  0.150 0.150 
Prospect theory variables         
=1 if CEO was ‘satisfied’ with the IPO  -0.216**       
  0.095       
CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain   -0.009**      
   0.004      
=1 if insiders were ‘satisfied’ with IPO    -0.239**     
    0.097     
insiders’ log net perceived wealth gain     -0.010***    
     0.003    
=1 if VCs were ‘satisfied’ with the IPO       -0.210  
       0.134  
VCs’ log net perceived wealth gain        -0.006 
        0.004 
         
Pseudo R2 23.5 % 23.8 % 23.9 % 23.9 % 24.1 %  23.2 % 23.3 % 
Wald χ2 test (all coeff. = 0) 284.4*** 290.2*** 291.3*** 292.6*** 294.4***  184.4*** 185.8*** 
Number of observations 1,203  1,203  1,197  1,203  1,197    687    687 
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Table V. Controlling for CEO Retention 
We re-estimate the models reported in Table IV controlling for whether or not the same CEO was in charge of the issuing 
firm at the time of the IPO and the SEO. As before the dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the 
firm switched underwriter between the IPO and the SEO, and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables are as defined in Table 
IV. In column 3, the sample size declines by six observations for which the dollar-valued proxy of issuer satisfaction cannot 
be computed due to division by zero. Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in italics. We denote significance at the 1% and 5% level by *** and **, respectively. 
 
 Same CEO at IPO and SEO? 
 Yes No  Yes No 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Firm and offer characteristics      
log IPO filing size ($m) -0.041 0.039  -0.010 0.046 
 0.065 0.140  0.065 0.137 
ln(1+age at IPO) -0.049 -0.064  -0.047 -0.060 
 0.055 0.139  0.056 0.138 
=1 if EPS>0 -0.241** -0.544**  -0.224** -0.552** 
 0.100 0.251  0.101 0.252 
ln(1+initial IPO return) -0.149 -1.298  -0.054 -1.463 
 0.223 0.919  0.231 0.969 
ln(days from IPO to SEO) 0.697*** 0.254***  0.711*** 0.247***
 0.064 0.179  0.065 0.179 
Bank characteristics      
IPO bank’s Carter-Manaster rank -0.203*** -0.118  -0.208*** -0.125 
 0.034 0.079  0.034 0.078 
=1 if IPO bank covers stock -0.439*** -0.646**  -0.435*** -0.649** 
 0.120 0.280  0.121 0.279 
=1 if IPO bank’s analyst is all-star -0.169 0.018  -0.181 0.033 
 0.127 0.403  0.128 0.403 
Prospect theory variables      
=1 if CEO was ‘satisfied’ with the IPO -0.235** -0.069    
 0.101 0.285    
CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain    -0.010*** 0.002 
    0.004 0.012 
      
Pseudo R2 24.0 % 16.3 %  24.2 % 16.3 % 
Wald χ2 test (all coeff. = 0) 253.1*** 29.1***  254.9*** 29.0*** 
Number of observations 1,082 121  1,076 121 
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Table VI. Controlling for CEO Background 
We re-estimate the models reported in Table V controlling for CEO background. We define a CEO as ‘experienced’ if he or she was CEO of another firm prior to joining 
the sample firm. We also condition on the CEO’s education. The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm switched underwriter between 
the IPO and the SEO, and 0 otherwise. Where we use the dollar-valued proxy of issuer satisfaction, the sample size declines by six observations. Intercepts are not shown. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics. We denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Experienced CEO?   CEO has postgraduate degree? 
 Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Firm and offer characteristics          
log IPO filing size ($m) 0.053 -0.070 0.065 -0.033 -0.089 0.010 -0.046 0.041 
 0.134 0.074 0.135 0.075 0.110 0.081 0.110 0.082 
ln(1+age at IPO) 0.003 -0.069 0.007 -0.067 -0.072 -0.036 -0.072 -0.032 
 0.105 0.065 0.106 0.066 0.128 0.061 0.128 0.062 
=1 if EPS>0 -0.480** -0.174 -0.467** -0.158 -0.108 -0.274** -0.088 -0.256** 
 0.212 0.113 0.213 0.114 0.169 0.129 0.170 0.130 
ln(1+initial IPO return) -0.614 -0.033 -0.451 0.048 -0.229 -0.120 -0.138 -0.021 
 0.520 0.243 0.529 0.252 0.369 0.286 0.383 0.293 
ln(days from IPO to SEO) 0.591*** 0.725*** 0.605*** 0.739*** 0.839*** 0.633*** 0.858*** 0.645***
 0.136 0.073 0.139 0.073 0.112 0.079 0.113 0.080 
Bank characteristics         
IPO bank’s Carter-Manaster rank -0.246*** -0.186*** -0.248*** -0.193*** -0.118** -0.256*** -0.121** -0.263***
 0.077 0.038 0.077 0.038 0.054 0.043 0.054 0.043 
=1 if IPO bank covers stock -0.535** -0.428*** -0.523** -0.425*** -0.610*** -0.372*** -0.616*** -0.362** 
 0.258 0.136 0.259 0.137 0.224 0.143 0.226 0.144 
=1 if IPO bank’s analyst is all-star -0.158 -0.177 -0.187 -0.185 -0.093 -0.188 -0.091 -0.207 
 0.250 0.146 0.250 0.146 0.238 0.151 0.239 0.153 
Prospect theory variables         
=1 if CEO was ‘satisfied’ with the IPO 0.002 -0.284**   -0.225 -0.247**   
 0.219 0.114   0.185 0.122   
CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain   -0.004 -0.012***   -0.010 -0.011** 
   0.009 0.004   0.007 0.005 
Pseudo R2 25.4 % 23.9 % 25.6 % 24.0 % 27.8 % 22.7 % 28.0 % 22.9 % 
Wald χ2 test (all coeff. = 0) 60.3*** 194.4*** 60.6*** 195.9*** 105.0*** 167.0*** 106.7*** 167.4*** 
Number of observations 250 832 249 827  350 732 348 728 
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Table VII. Assessing the Plausibility of the Behavioral Interpretation  
Columns 1 and 2 investigate whether the bursting of the ‘dot-com bubble’ changed the effect of satisfaction with the IPO 
outcome on SEO underwriter choice. We re-estimate the models reported in Table IV, interacting the behavioral proxies with 
a dummy variable identifying firms that went public during the ‘bubble’ period (1999Q1-2000Q2) and completed their SEO 
after the ‘bubble’ burst in the second quarter of 2000. In columns 3 and 4, we investigate whether the behavioral proxies 
merely capture the effect of positive revisions in IPO proceeds, which issuing firms may view as a signal of the underwriter’s 
skill. Proceeds revisions are defined as the percentage difference between actual proceeds (ignoring the over-allotment option 
where exercised) and intended proceeds as filed in the registration statement. All other explanatory variables are as defined in 
Table IV. In columns 2 and 4, the sample size declines by six observations for which the dollar-valued proxy of issuer 
satisfaction cannot be computed due to division by zero. Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are reported in italics. We denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: indicator = 1 if firm switches underwriter 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Firm and offer characteristics      
log IPO filing size ($m) -0.045 -0.002  -0.017 0.004 
 0.060 0.058  0.059 0.059 
ln(1+age at IPO) -0.056 -0.056  -0.058 -0.057 
 0.051 0.051  0.051 0.051 
=1 if EPS>0 -0.259*** -0.254***  -0.258*** -0.247***
 0.092 0.093  0.093 0.093 
ln(1+initial IPO return) -0.351 -0.277  -0.160 -0.095 
 0.235 0.242  0.230 0.232 
ln(days from IPO to SEO) 0.629*** 0.645***  0.648*** 0.659***
 0.058 0.058  0.057 0.058 
Bank characteristics      
IPO bank’s Carter-Manaster rank -0.186*** -0.191***  -0.189*** -0.193***
 0.032 0.032  0.033 0.033 
=1 if IPO bank covers stock -0.488*** -0.477***  -0.481*** -0.473***
 0.109 0.109  0.110 0.110 
=1 if IPO bank’s analyst is all-star -0.177 -0.191  -0.168 -0.181 
 0.119 0.120  0.119 0.120 
Prospect theory variables      
=1 if CEO was ‘satisfied’ with the IPO -0.245**   -0.178*  
 0.096   0.109  
        × post-bubble SEO 0.381**     
 0.194     
CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain  -0.010***   -0.009** 
  0.004   0.004 
        × post-bubble SEO  0.018*    
  0.010    
Proceeds revisions      
change in offer size relative to first filing    -0.207 -0.111 
    0.190 0.194 
      
Pseudo R2 24.1 % 24.1 %  24.0 % 24.1 % 
Wald χ2 test (all coeff. = 0) 291.0*** 292.7***  300.6*** 300.0*** 
Number of observations 1,203  1,197  1,203  1,197 
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Table VIII. Conditional Logit Models of the SEO Underwriter Choice 
The conditional logits model issuing companies as choosing their SEO lead-manager from among a set of two banks: the IPO 
underwriter and a ‘new bank’. The new bank is the one actually chosen if a switch has taken place. If the firm retains its IPO 
underwriter, we assume the alternative new bank has the same characteristics as either the IPO underwriter (Scenario 1), the 
average bank (Scenario 2), or the best bank (Scenario 3). The parameters for Scenario 2 are a Carter-Manaster rank of 7.25, 
no research coverage, and the absence of an all-star analyst. For Scenario 3, they are a rank of 9.1 (the highest possible), 
coverage, and the presence of an all-star analyst. We relate the probability of observing these choices to two classes of 
variables: the issuer’s attributes and the attributes of the choice (i.e. the banks’ characteristics). Note that while issuer 
attributes vary across issuers, they are constant for each issuer whichever bank is chosen. Conditional logit models estimate 
the effect of issuer attributes by interacting such variables with a dummy for one of the choices. Without loss of generality, 
we interact them with a dummy ‘newbank’ that equals 1 for the new bank. The coefficients are interpreted as estimates of the 
effect of issuer attributes on the likelihood that the issuer switches banks. In columns 2, 4, and 6, the sample size declines by 
six observations for which the dollar-valued proxy of issuer satisfaction cannot be computed due to division by zero. White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics. We denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Attributes of the issuer        
log IPO filing size ($m) × newbank -0.744*** -0.719*** -0.300*** -0.288***  -1.032*** -1.031***
 0.079 0.080 0.097 0.097  0.111 0.112 
ln(1+age at IPO) × newbank -0.170** -0.170** -0.177* -0.179*  0.032 0.025 
 0.086 0.086 0.105 0.105  0.112 0.112 
(dummy =1 if EPS>0) × newbank -0.706*** -0.723*** -0.839*** -0.843***  -0.464** -0.480** 
 0.155 0.155 0.188 0.187  0.214 0.214 
ln(1+initial IPO return) × newbank -1.666*** -1.979*** -0.564 -0.707  -1.877*** -1.917***
 0.386 0.401 0.440 0.452  0.472 0.482 
ln(days from IPO to SEO) × newbank 0.571*** 0.518*** 0.606*** 0.563***  0.893*** 0.859***
 0.054 0.052 0.066 0.064  0.079 0.077 
Attributes of the choice        
bank’s Carter-Manaster rank 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.396*** 0.394***  -0.085 -0.088 
 0.045 0.045 0.052 0.052  0.058 0.058 
=1 if bank covers stock -1.409*** -1.392*** 2.650*** 2.653***  -0.921*** -0.907***
 0.183 0.183 0.182 0.182  0.221 0.220 
=1 if bank’s analyst is all-star 0.148 0.145 0.321 0.308  -3.806*** -3.805***
 0.283 0.284 0.243 0.243  0.240 0.239 
Prospect theory variables        
(=1 if CEO was ‘satisfied’ with IPO) × newbank -0.620***  -0.546***   -0.506**  
 0.159  0.192   0.226  
(CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain) × newbank  -0.013**  -0.015**   -0.015** 
  0.006  0.007   0.007 
        
Pseudo R2 26.4 % 25.6 % 46.0 % 45.6 %  57.7 % 57.5 % 
Wald χ2 test (all coeff. = 0) 440.1*** 425.0*** 766.5*** 755.8***  962.1*** 954.2*** 
Number of firms 1,203  1,197  1,203  1,197  1,203  1,197 
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Table IX. Determinants of SEO Spreads 
We estimate ordinary least-squares models with the underwriter spread charged for the SEO as the dependent variable. SEO 
spreads are measured in percent. Following the literature, we control for the amount raised at the SEO (in log real dollars), 
firm quality (measured using the volatility of daily stock returns estimated over the 230 trading days ending 20 days before 
the SEO, the EPS dummy introduced in Table IV, and the firm’s real log market capitalization as of the month-end prior to 
the SEO date), and aggregate primary market activity (measured as the log real amount raised in all IPOs and SEOs in the 
three calendar months preceding the SEO). The sample size decreases by the 24 firms for which prospectuses fail to report 
the spread paid to the SEO underwriter. In columns 2 through 4, the sample size declines by six observations for which the 
dollar-valued proxy of issuer satisfaction cannot be computed due to division by zero. White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are reported in italics. We denote significance at the 1% and 5% level by *** and **, respectively. 
 
 Whole sample  Switching underwriter? 
    No Yes 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Issue size      
log real SEO proceeds -0.208*** -0.208***  -0.230*** -0.174** 
 0.037 0.036  0.037 0.080 
Firm quality      
daily stock return volatility  0.006*** 0.006***  0.004*** 0.008***
 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.002 
=1 if EPS>0 -0.205*** -0.196***  -0.185*** -0.173** 
 0.042 0.041  0.046 0.075 
log real market capitalization -0.432*** -0.434***  -0.363*** -0.523***
 0.034 0.034  0.040 0.069 
Primary market activity      
log aggregate proceeds in prior three months 0.158*** 0.162***  0.131*** 0.221** 
 0.049 0.049  0.050 0.113 
Prospect theory variables      
=1 if CEO was ‘satisfied’ with the IPO 0.117***     
 0.038     
CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain  -0.018***  -0.031*** -0.002 
  0.006  0.006 0.011 
CEO’s log net perceived wealth gain * (dummy = 1 if   0.038***  0.057*** 0.015 
              CEO was ‘satisfied’)  0.011  0.012 0.022 
      
constant 6.846*** 6.630***  6.510*** 6.494***
 0.491 0.492  0.492 1.101 
      
Adjusted R2 53.7 % 54.4 %  55.4 % 50.1 % 
Wald F-test (all coeff. = 0) 119.8*** 103.7***  65.9*** 35.3*** 
Number of observations 1,179 1,173  765 408 
        
 
